Principles for a Successful Competition Agency
Timothy J. Murist
It has been thirty years since I first joined the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) staff and began the professional relationship that
would anchor my career. Throughout, I have often reflected on what
makes public institutions successful. Part I of this Essay provides a
framework for defining success in government agencies. Building on
that definition, Part II offers six guiding principles for an effective
competition agency. These principles focus not just on the goals for
successful policy, but also on how such policy should be created and
implemented. Of course, good policy based on sound economics and
profound respect for fundamental legal principles is essential. Nonetheless, no matter how well crafted a policy may be, no public institution achieves success without a coherent strategy for exercising its
authority and spending its resources wisely. Strong policy ideas must
be married to effective implementation.
While discussing these guiding principles, I describe the consensus that has developed regarding the proper goals of competition policy. The complementary Essay by former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky also acknowledges this consensus and touches on some disagreements at the margins.' I conclude in Part III with brief comments on
the areas of disagreement identified by Chairman Pitofsky. This discussion largely serves to underscore, not to undermine, the extent of
the modem consensus regarding the proper goals of competition policy.
I. WHAT IS "SUCCESS" FOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES?

Obviously, we could hold an entire symposium on how to measure government "success." This Part attempts something a bit less heroic. I want only to outline a basic framework for measuring success.
In Washington, a prominent definition of institutional success -as
reflected in favorable press accounts and congressional attentionmeasures action: for example, the number of new initiatives, the numt Former Chairman, Federal Trade Commission. The views here are my own and not
necessarily those of the Commission or of any other Commissioner. I would like to thank Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Thomas Krattenmaker, and William E. Kovacic for their considerable help in
preparing this Essay.
1 Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present,and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade
Commission, 72 U Chi L Rev 209 (2005).
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ber of large cases brought, and the size of the companies affected. For
an agency like the FTC, the most attention is paid publicly to the
prosecution of cases, preferably "big" ones, or to the launching of
"tough" regulations, while nonlitigation activities that have a major
impact on public policy or less obviously significant cases and rules
that do not tackle large players, but that alter doctrine in important
ways, are usually overlooked Closing ill-conceived measures from
previous administrations can result in adverse publicity, especially if
the initiatives received favorable attention when launched.
The brevity of the tenure of government officials exacerbates the
shortcomings of this measure of success. An agency head garners great
attention by beginning "bold" initiatives and suing big companies.
When the bill comes due for the hard work of turning initiatives into
successful regulation and proving big cases in court, these agency
heads are often gone from the public stage. Their successors are left
either to trim excessive proposals or even to default, with possible
damage to agency reputation.
The departed agency heads, if anyone in the Washington establishment now cares about their views, can always blame failure on
faulty implementation by their successors. Because of the great difficulty in determining which of the many players who worked on an
initiative was responsible for its failure, blaming those who followed
will usually be at least plausible. Moreover, the focus in Washington
will have shifted to the bold proposals of some new agency head, leaving less time or interest to determine what caused the failure of previous proposals.
Clearly, institutional success can and should be measured by
means other than column inches in newspapers or the simple number
of cases filed. One preferable definition comes from the field of economics. An economist measures the success of an action by determining whether its benefits outweigh its costs. This analysis is a useful
starting point, but it has serious operational shortfalls. For one, unlike
a for-profit private enterprise, an agency's performance often lacks
objective measures, such as profitability and share price. Whatever
one's views of Jack Welch's personality or management style, General
Electric's success could be measured in its bottom line. A second
problem is that, even when economists attempt measures of agency
performance, they frequently disagree, or the available data do not
permit firm conclusions.

2

See Tyler Cowen, Why Does Freedom Wax and Wane? 20-21 (Mercatus Center, George

Mason 2000).
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Nevertheless, one can propose a definition of success that draws
upon economics and recognizes these shortfalls. An important insight
of the economics of principal-agent relations aids this effort at definition: measure outputs when possible; when you cannot, focus on inputs.' Moreover, for a public agency, public opinion is relevant, but
that opinion must be well-informed and appropriately consider the
agency's mission.
With this background, let me propose a three-part definition for
agency success. First, a primary component for a successful agency is a
clear understanding of and support for its core mission among its constituents-the agency staff, the private entities it regulates, the courts,
its peers in government, and (depending on the agency) the academic
community. This does not mean that the agency's mission must be
"popular" or that the constituents must support every particular
agency action. For example, most staff in a budget office such as the
Federal Office of Management and Budget, members of the public,
and other government agencies agree that budget bureaus should try
to protect the public fisc even though they may not agree with specific
recommendations to limit spending.
Second, this core mission must derive from a vision of the institution clearly shared among and respected by constituents not just today
but over long periods, enduring through electoral cycles. Over long
periods of time-perhaps decades-scholars usually adjudge favorably the core mission of successful agencies. Thus, by this definition, the
Civil Aeronautics Board's core mission-held for decades-of tight
regulation of airline competition failed when confronted with massive
evidence that the regulation's costs exceeded its benefits.' The FTC's
core competition mission for over thirty years- enforcement of the
Robinson-Patman Act'-had failed by the 1970s when the academy
and most practitioners came to consider this enforcement as harmful
to consumers.
3
See generally Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production,Information Costs,
and Economic Organization,62 Am Econ Rev 777 (1972) (proposing that a firm can sometimes
more economically monitor productivity by measuring worker inputs rather than by measuring
outputs, which the authors refer to as "across market").
4
See Robert M. Hardaway, TransportationDeregulation(1976-1984): Turning the Tide, 14
Transp L J 101, 134-50 (1985) (arguing that airline deregulation has succeeded on all fronts by
both proving to be false the fears raised by those in favor of regulation and substantially improving the airline industry for consumers and competitors alike).
5
Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 49 Stat 1526 (1936), codified as amended at
15 USC §§ 13a, 13b, 21a (2000).
6
This criticism was reflected in the courts and in the American Bar Association's Report
of the Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission 67-68 (Sept 15, 1969), in which Pitofsky played a key role. See also Richard Posner, The Robinson-PatmanAct: FederalRegulation of
Price Differences (AEI 1976).
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Finally, besides a clear and respected long-term understanding of
its core mission, a successful public institution needs a coherent strategy for exercising its authority and spending its resources. A key manifestation of this strategy is publicizing its positive agenda-the measures the agency intends to pursue to accomplish its core mission.
Without a general strategy and a positive agenda, an agency becomes
a passive observer, swept along by external developments and temporary exigencies. An institution that merely reacts to circumstances and
does not work from a coherent philosophy will ultimately fail to
achieve lasting success. This positive agenda must direct not just the
agency heads but the institution at all levels, from line staff to managers
to executives.7 For the agency's staff, an articulated positive agenda focuses efforts on measures most likely to fulfill the institution's mission.
The FTC has such a positive agenda, a product of the work of
many people over many years. The heart of this positive agenda is to
search for practices that harm consumers by hampering the competitive process and violating the basic rules that govern exchange. The
FTC's success, in large part, reflects this shared vision of the agency's
core mission, which has evolved for over twenty years through several
administrations. Antitrust has become an area of bipartisan cooperation. Although disagreements exist in close cases, there is widespread
agreement that the clearly articulated purpose of antitrust is to protect consumers, that economic analysis should guide case selection,
and that horizontal cases, both mergers and agreements among competitors, are the mainstays of enforcement. Moreover, today there is
bipartisan recognition that antitrust law is a way of helping to organize our economy. A freely functioning market, subject to the rules of
antitrust, provides maximum benefits to consumers.
Robert Pitofsky's tenure as FTC chairman was in that vein of bipartisanship, as I believe was mine. Of course, he brought his intellect,
scholarship, and management skills to the job. But a key reason for his
success as chairman was that his agenda and enforcement policies reflected the bipartisan consensus of the agency's core mission. Those
policies were not significantly different from those of his predecessor
in the previous administration, nor from mine. The disagreements considered at the end of this Essay are truly at the margins.

7
The importance of these different levels of an agency is a prominent theme in the best
book on agencies ever written, James Q. Wilson's Bureaucracy:What Government Agencies Do
and Why They Do It (Basic 1989).
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II. GUIDES FOR AN EFFECTIVE COMPETITION AGENCY

Building upon the foregoing discussion of "success," let me turn
to six guides that competition agencies should follow. These guides
explain how to create and implement successfully a positive agenda.
A. Develop a Proper Understanding of the Role of a Competition
Agency
An effective competition agency must understand its proper role.
The United States has largely chosen markets to organize its economy.
This decision is firmly grounded in the understanding that open markets and competition best guarantee commercial freedom, economic
efficiency, and consumer welfare. Antitrust plays a major role in shaping our markets, our institutions, and the relationships among market
participants! Indeed, the Supreme Court has called the Sherman Act9
"a comprehensive charter of economic liberty.'O
Antitrust law helps maintain effective competition by prohibiting
conduct that unreasonably restricts markets. Antitrust law is, in effect,
a form of regulation that competes with other regulatory structures
and, in most instances, makes direct regulation unnecessary. Antitrust
regulation, however, is not of the intrusive stripe. Antitrust does not
prescribe command and control regulation, nor detailed rules of conduct. Indeed, modern antitrust's mainstays are simply to avoid mergers in highly concentrated industries conducive to anticompetitive
behavior and to avoid naked restraints (that is, those without efficiency justifications) on trade with competitors. Antitrust is one of the
economy's umpires, not one of its star players.
Antitrust's goal is to protect consumers. Antitrust law should care
intensely about sustaining the effectiveness of competition and display
indifference about the identities or fortunes of individual market participants. A well-functioning market serves consumers because competition presses producers to offer lower prices or to improve product
quality to succeed. Competition also motivates sellers to provide
truthful, useful information about their products and drives them to
fulfill their promises to consumers." Through improved theoretical
8 See Northern Pacific Railway Co v United States, 356 US 1, 4 (1958) (stating that competition will best preserve democratic political and social institutions).
9 15 USC § 1 et seq (2000).
10 Northern Pacific,356 US at 4.
11 See, for example, Paul H. Rubin, The Economics of Regulating Deception, 10 Cato J 667,
679 (1991) (arguing that pooling equilibrium will give incentives for sellers to disclose all product
information, and questioning the need for disclosure regulation); Howard Beales, Richard
Craswell, and Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J L & Econ
491,502 (1981) (same).
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understanding and painful practical experience, antitrust now finally
regards enhancing consumer welfare as its single unifying goal. Antitrust relies on sound economics, both theoretical and empirical.
While antitrust law most often involves enforcement against private parties, competition agencies must also consider the effects of
government actions. Protecting competition by focusing solely on private restraints is like trying to stop the water flow at a fork in a stream
by blocking only one channel. A system that sends private price fixers
to jail, but makes government regulation to fix prices legal, has not
completely addressed the competitive problem. It has simply dictated
the form that the problem will take.
The point can be restated as a competition policy theorem: regulatory success in attacking private restraints increases the efforts that
firms will devote to seeking public restraints. Indeed, rational firms
are likely to prefer public restraints. Public restraints can be far more
effective at restraining competition. Public restraints are often open
and notorious. Public restraints also solve the entry problem more
efficiently. Rather than ceaselessly monitoring the marketplace for
new rivals, a firm can simply rely on a public regime that, for example,
provides only a few licenses. Perhaps the clearest example of public
restraints that outperform private restraints are those that include
built-in cartel enforcement. While cheating often undermines private
cartels, those who cheat on public cartels, once identified, can be sanctioned through the government.
Because of the importance of public restraints, the FTC emphasizes enforcement against misusing government processes to restrain
competition. Although most uses of government to restrain competition do not violate antitrust law, certain egregious cases do. For example, the state can suppress competition, but the action must truly be
that of the state itself, not of private parties. Thus, in FTC v Ticor Title
Insurance Co,'2 the agency challenged title insurance companies' practice of agreeing among themselves on the fees they would charge for
background title searches.'3 While the law in many states authorized
such agreements, in some of these states the agreements were subject
to "negative option" state review, whereby rates set by private parties
were subject to veto at the state's discretion. The Court found that the
party claiming state action immunity'4 must show that the state offi-

12

504 US 621 (1992).

13 Idat638.
14 The state action doctrine, first articulated in Parkerv Brown, 317 US 341 (1943), shields
certain anticompetitive behavior from federal antitrust enforcement if the conduct is in furtherance of a clearly articulated state policy and is actively supervised by the state. See generally
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cials have taken the necessary affirmative steps to determine the specifics of the price-setting scheme. A state's mere failure to veto under
negative option review, the Court held, is insufficient."
More recently, in South Carolina State Board of Dentistry," the

FTC sued the board-a quasi-governmental entity established to supervise the practice of dentistry and dental hygiene -alleging that it
unlawfully restrained competition in the provision of preventive dental care by promulgating an emergency regulation that unreasonably
restricted the ability of dental hygienists to deliver preventive services
to children in South Carolina schools." After the regulation became
effective, treatment ceased for thousands of children. The complaint
further alleged that the board's action was "undertaken by selfinterested industry participants with economic interests at stake," and
that it "was contrary to state policy, and was not reasonably related to
any countervailing efficiencies or other benefits sufficient to justify its
harmful effects on competition and consumers.""
An additional competitive problem involves petitioning the government. Such petitions enjoy constitutional protection, but the privilege can be abused. For example, under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," a branded drug manufacturer lists patents claiming its branded drug in the "Orange Book"
compiled by the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Companies seeking FDA approval to market a generic equivalent of that
drug before patent expiration must provide notice to the branded
manufacturer, which can file a patent infringement action that triggers
an automatic thirty-month stay of the FDA approval process.0 The
FTC has examined allegations that individual brand-name drug manufacturers have used improper Orange Book listings to trigger the
thirty-month stay. For example, an FTC complaint filed against Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) alleged that BMS misled the FDA about the
scope, validity, and enforceability of patents to secure listing in the
Orange Book, breached its duty of good faith and candor with the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission, Report of the State Action Task Force 52-55 (Sept 2003), online at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/20O3/09/stateactionreport.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
15 Ticor, 504 US at 638.
16 In the Matter of South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, No 9311 (July 28, 2004)
(Opinion and Order of the Commission), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9311/
040728commissionopinion.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
17 Id at *2.
18 In the Matter of South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, No 9311, 1 (Sept 12, 2003)
(Complaint), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/socodentistcomp.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
19 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, codified as amended
at 21 USC § 355 (2000) (establishing the procedures a newly manufactured drug must follow
before entering interstate commerce).
20
21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) while pursuing new patents
claiming these drugs, and filed baseless patent infringement suits
against generic drug firms that sought FDA approval to market lowerpriced drugs.'
Although the BMS matter raised the question of whether the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine" protected the challenged conduct, because the case was resolved by consent order, rather than a trial on the
merits, the issue was not litigated. The FTC did, however, provide a
detailed explanation of its views on the immunity issue in the Analysis
to Aid Public Comment that accompanied the complaint and consent
order." The Commission not only stated that BMS's individual acts
were not Noerr-protected, but also that a clear and systematic pattern
of anticompetitive misuse of governmental processes-such as BMS's
alleged conduct -is inconsistent with Noerr."

Moreover, in 2003 the FTC sued Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) for allegedly committing fraud in connection with regulatory proceedings before the California Air Resources Board
(CARB) regarding the development of reformulated gasoline
(RFG).2 The administrative complaint states that during the RFG
rulemaking process, Unocal made materially false and misleading
statements to CARB and other regulatory participants. While stating
that its emissions research data were "nonproprietary" and "available
to CARB ... and the general public," Unocal failed to disclose that it

had pending patent claims on these research results and that it intended to assert its proprietary interests in the future. 6 The complaint
contends that throughout the rulemaking process, Unocal, in its inter21 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co, No C-4076 (Apr 14,2003) (Complaint), online
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbcmp.pdf (visited Nov 26, 2004). See also In
the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co, No C-4076 (Apr 14, 2003) (Decision and Order), online
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbdo.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
22 First articulated in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight,Inc
365 US 127 (1961), the doctrine holds that antitrust law does not reach certain anticompetitive
conduct that consists of, or is incidental to, petitioning the government. Id at 135-36. See also
United Mine Workers of America v Pennington, 381 US 657 (1965) (holding that joint efforts to
influence public officials do not violate antitrust law, even if intended to eliminate competition).
23 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co, No C-4076 (Mar 7, 2003) (Analysis to Aid
Public Comment), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyersanalysis.htm (visited Nov
26,2004).
24
Id. The Commission also stated that Noerr does not protect conduct that merely triggers
ministerial government action rather than seeking a discretionary decision. See In re Buspirone
PatentLitigation, 185 F Supp 2d 363, 369-73 (SD NY 2002), in which the district court issued an
order denying Noerr immunity and adopting much of the reasoning in a Commission amicus
brief filed in the case.
25 In the Matter of Union Oil Co of California,No 9305 (Mar 4, 2003) (Complaint), online
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/unocalcmp.htm (visited Nov 26,2004).
26
Id 2(a).
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actions with CARB and other industry participants, intentionally perpetuated the materially false and misleading impression that it had
relinquished, or would not enforce, any proprietary interests in its
emissions research results regarding the new RFG'
Although an FTC administrative law judge held that Unocal's efforts in soliciting action by CARB were protected by the NoerrPennington doctrine as a matter of law, in an opinion I authored the
FTC disagreed and remanded the case for factfinding. The Commission stressed the concern that "misrepresentations that distort government decision making in ways that create or shield market power
may inflict severe and long-lasting public harm."'29 Although it recognized that "any rule regarding petitioning based on misrepresentation
must be fashioned and applied with care, so as not to undermine principles of federalism and effective government decision making,"" it
determined that "these reservations may be overcome in appropriate
settings,"'" and found no impediment to the complaint as a matter of
law.2 "Whether we view misrepresentation as a distinct variant of
sham petitioning or as a separate exception to Noerr-Pennington,the
fabric of existing law is rich enough to extend antitrust coverage, in
appropriate circumstances, to anticompetitive conduct flowing from
deliberate misrepresentations that undermine the legitimacy of government proceedings."33 The FTC held that
false petitioning loses Noerr-Penningtonprotection only in limited circumstances, such as when the petitioning occurs outside
the political arena; the misrepresentation is deliberate, factually
verifiable, and central to the outcome of the proceeding or case;
and it is possible to demonstrate and remedy this effect without
undermining the integrity of the deceived governmental entity.
Integrate Competition and Consumer Protection Policy

B.

Besides antitrust laws, most modern governments design laws to
protect consumers directly. The same government agency need not
necessarily handle competition and consumer issues, although the
Id I 2(c).
In the Matter of Union Oil Co of California, No 9305 (July 6, 2004) (Opinion of the
Commission), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/O40706commissionopinion.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
29 Id at 24.
30 Id at 21.
31 Id at 22.
32 Id at 45.
33 Id at 30.
34 Id at 48.
27

28
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FTC has found this combination highly useful. Competition and consumer protection agencies, however, should recognize the complementary nature of their missions. Around the world, this recognition is
growing.35
Competition and open markets work best with rules, not anarchy.
Our market economy has a well-specified structure of property rights,
contract law, and other rules of conduct. One of government's most
useful roles is to provide what are called default rules-terms that
apply when the parties do not explicitly specify otherwise. The more
efficient these rules, the greater the scope for exchange and thus the
greater the gain to consumers. When contracts are formed, even in the
most complex transactions, parties cannot specify the terms for every
possible contingency. Instead, courts, legislatures, and agencies have
developed default rules that are like buying off-the-rack rather than
specially tailored clothes. Many of these rules of exchange are so basic-for example, rules against fraud, breach of contract, and deceptive advertising-that we do not even think about them as rules at all.
In this way, a vast common law has evolved to facilitate transactions.
Enforcing these rules that help ensure that consumers can make
well-informed decisions is the core of the FTC's consumer protection
program. Prevention of fraud and deception helps consumers in two
ways: first, most obviously, by deterring dishonest sellers; and second,
by making it easier for honest sellers to make credible product claims.
Both consumer and competition policy serve to improve consumer welfare, and they naturally complement each other. Competition theory that excludes consumer policy is not only shortsighted but,
given the growing importance of consumer issues, can ultimately be
self-defeating. Consumer policy that ignores its impact on competition
can result in cures worse than the disease. An agency's contribution to
the economy can be measured by its progress in increasing consumer
welfare overall. Thus, well-conceived competition and consumer policies should take complementary paths to the same goal.
35 See Timothy J. Muris, The Interface of Competition and Consumer Protection,remarks at
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute's Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on International
Antitrust Law and Policy, New York City (Oct 31, 2002), online at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/muris/021031fordham.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004) (discussing the newfound relationship
between antitrust and consumer protection); FTC Press Release, FTC Chairman Addresses
OECD on Intersection of Competition and Consumer Protection Issues, (Oct 17, 2003), online at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/oecdmtg.htm (visited Nov 26, 2004) (discussing my meeting with
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), where I spoke about
the intersection of competition and consumer protection issues); John Vickers, Competition Is
for Consumers: A Speech to the Social Market Foundation (Feb 21, 2002), online at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyresB4228493-EC7C-4641-8710-EBE4325DBB8E/0/speOl02.pdf
(visited Nov 26, 2004) (the Director General of Britain's Office of Fair Trading arguing that
"competition is increasingly being recognised as a core consumer issue").
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At its core, government should protect consumer sovereignty by
addressing practices that impede informed consumer choice.36 Preventing deception, while fostering the free flow of truthful and nonmisleading information to consumers, is crucial to this mission. Accordingly, the FTC strives to stop deception without imposing unduly burdensome restrictions that might chill the dissemination of information
useful for consumers. Because truthful and nonmisleading information
is also critical for competition, the Commission opposes overly broad
restrictions on the provision of such information, whether imposed by
the government or private organizations.37
Because of its antitrust responsibilities, the FTC knows that robust competition is the best means to protect consumers. Rivalry
among producers, and the threat and fact of entry from new suppliers,
fuel the contest to satisfy consumers. In competitive markets, firms
prosper by beating their rivals. In turn, competition has important implications for the design of policies to regulate advertising and marketing practices. Without a continual reminder of competition's benefits, consumer protection programs can impose controls that ultimately
diminish the very competition that increases consumer choice.
Competition principles help ensure that consumer protection is
consistent with consumer sovereignty. They remind us that some consumer protection measures-even those motivated by the best of in36
For example, consumer sovereignty may be frustrated if sellers do not honor their contracts with consumers. See Orkin Exterminating Co, Inc, 108 FTC 263, 364-68 (1986) (holding
that Orkin's unilateral increase in renewal fees caused unavoidable consumer harm), affd, 849
F2d 1354,1364-65 (11th Cir 1988).
37 See, for example, In the Matter of Request for Comment on FirstAmendment Issues, No
02N-0209, 4-5 (Sept 13, 2002) (Comments of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics, Bureau of
Consumer Protection, and Office of Policy Planning), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/
fdatextversion.pdf (visited Nov 26, 2004) (suggesting that when consumers have more information about the good they purchase, more incentives are created for sellers to satisfy customers);
In the Matter of American Medical Association, 94 FTC 701, 993-96 (1979) (challenging the Association's prohibition on physician advertising), enforced as modified, 638 F2d 443 (2d Cir
1980), affd per curiam by an equally divided court, 455 US 676 (1982); Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement in Regard to Comparative Advertising, 16 CFR § 14.15 (2003) (encouraging
the naming or referencing of competitors, but with clarity and disclosure if required to avoid
deception); Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protectionand the Regulation of Advertising, 90 Harv L Rev 661,670-71 (1977) (discussing the advantages to consumers and competition
that flow from comparative advertising).
38
See, for example, Pauline M. Ippolito and Janis K. Pappalardo, Advertising Nutrition &
Health: Evidence from Food Advertising, 1977-1997 170-71 (FTC 2002) (discussing the importance of the role of marketing in consumer goods for crafting policy); Pauline M. Ippolito and
Alan D. Mathios, Information and Advertising Policy: A Study of Fat and Cholesterol Consumption in the United States, 1977-1990 241-46 (FTC 1996) (concluding that diet-disease claims in
advertising may benefit consumers); Pauline M. Ippoito and Alan D. Mathios, Health Claims in
Advertising and Labeling:A Study of the Cereal Market (FTC 1989) (noting that health claims in
advertising significantly alter consumer behavior and reach groups not reached by government
and general health information).
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tentions-can hinder sellers from providing what consumers demand.
The FTC recently participated, for example, in a court challenge to a
state law that banned anyone other than licensed funeral directors
from selling caskets to the public over the internet. While recognizing
the state's intent to protect its consumers, the agency questioned
whether the law did more harm than good. In an amicus brief, the
FIC noted, "Rather than protect[ing] consumers by exposing funeral
directors to meaningful competition, the [law] protects funeral directors from facing any competition from third-party casket sellers.""
Similarly, the FTC recently filed an amicus brief challenging a decision
by West Virginia's State Bar Committee on Unauthorized Practice of
Law that barred nonattorneys from performing certain functions associated with the settlement of residential real estate transactions. The
FTC argued that, given a complete lack of evidence that consumers
suffered any harm from lay practice, the restriction on competition
"serve[s] to protect West Virginia attorneys' economic interests," not
the public interest.4°
C.

Engage in Competition Policy Research and Development

Another principle for successful antitrust agencies is to engage in
competition policy research and development. Continuing, substantial
efforts to increase an agency's knowledge base are necessary to address new commercial phenomena, to analyze complex technical issues involving health and safety, and to respond to new technologies.
These developments often occur in a regulatory environment in which
a competition agency must use the force of its arguments, not fiat, to
persuade public authorities to cooperate in law enforcement and
other forms of policymaking.
Just as a high-technology company must research to develop new
products, so too must a competition agency expand its knowledge to
design law enforcement and other policies to conquer current and
anticipated consumer problems. A farsighted feature of Congress's
institutional design is that it gave the FTC flexible tools to perform
the necessary research and development. Given that the branch of
39
Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae the Federal Trade Commission, Powers v Harris, No CIV-01-445-F, 1 (WD Okla filed Aug 29, 2002), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/
okamicus.pdf (visited Nov 26, 2004). The district court and the Tenth Circuit upheld the state law.
Powers v Harris, 2002 US Dist LEXIS 26939 (WD Okla), affd, 379 F3d 1208 (10th Cir 2004),
petition for cert filed, 73 USLW 3338 (Nov 22, 2004). But see Casket Royale, Inc v Mississippi,
124 F Supp 2d 434, 440 (SD Miss 2000) (overturning a state law limiting casket sales to licensed
funeral directors); Craigmilesv Giles, 110 F Supp 2d 658,663 (ED Tenn 2000) (same).
40 Brief Amici Curiae of the Federal Trade Commission and the United States, McMahon v
Advanced Title Services Co of West Virginia, No 31706, 10 (W Va filed May 25, 2004), online at
http://www.ftc.govfbe[VO40017.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
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economics most relevant to a competition agency-industrial organization-has become increasingly theoretical, with less attention on
empirical evidence, the need for such government research and development is all the greater."
One example of how the FTC uses these tools to ensure that it
accurately understands and properly responds to new challenges is its
initiative on e-commerce. The Commission sponsored a three-day
workshop on Possible Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the Internet. 2 The workshop examined state regulations and
private arrangements, often adopted for purposes unrelated to competition, which may aid existing bricks-and-mortar businesses at the expense of new internet competitors. The workshop spawned several
projects. For example, the FTC Bureau of Economics studied the
availability of wine over the internet. 3 The study found that a state's
ban on direct wine shipments from out-of-state sellers reduces the
varieties of wine available and prevents consumers from purchasing
certain premium wines at lower prices. The FTC staff then assessed
the impact on wine consumers of barriers to e-commerce, concluding
that states could benefit consumers by allowing direct shipment of
wine to individual purchasers."
A more resource-intensive project at the FTC has been holding
in-depth hearings on specific topics. Much credit belongs to former
Chairman Pitofsky, who prompted the FTC to look beyond litigation
alone to the "full panoply" of competition policy tools at its disposal.
From the beginning of his chairmanship, Pitofsky restored the
agency's role in using factfinding hearings and workshops to identify
the appropriate path of future policies and to formulate a law enforcement and advocacy agenda. The agency's hearings on globalization and innovation," collaboration among competitors," and B2B
41 On the state of modem industrial organization economics and the dearth of empirical
research, see Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy,
remarks at the George Mason Law Review's Winter Antitrust Symposium, Washington, D.C. (Jan
15, 2003), online at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/improveconfoundatio.htm (visited Nov 26,
2004).
42
Notice of Public Workshop and Opportunity to Comment, 67 Fed Reg 48472 (July 24,
2002). The workshop agenda, the participants' written statements, and public submissions are
online at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/index.htm (visited Nov 26, 2004).
43 Alan E. Wiseman and Jerry Ellig, How Many Bottles Make a Case Against Prohibition?
Online Wine and Virginia's Direct Shipment Ban (FrC Working Paper Mar 2003), online at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp258.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
44 FIC Staff Report, Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-Commerce: Wine 40 (July
2003), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
45
See FTC Staff Report, Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New
High-Tech, Global Marketplace (CCH 1996), available online at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global!
report/gc-vl.pdf (visited Nov 26, 2004).
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ventures" provided valuable examples of how the FTC could use its
distinctive capabilities to communicate with and to the business community and develop a consensus about the future course of policy.
This effort continued while I was chairman. In October 2003, the
agency issued a report on how to promote innovation by finding the
proper balance of competition and patent law and policy. The report
followed hearings that the FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ)
convened in February 2002, which took place over twenty-four days
and involved more than 300 panelists. The federal agencies heard perspectives from business representatives from large and small firms, the
independent inventor community, leading patent and antitrust organizations and practitioners, and scholars in economics and patent and
antitrust law. In the report, the FTC proposed legislative and regulatory changes to improve patent quality, including recommendations to
create a new administrative procedure to make it easier for firms to
challenge a patent's validity at the PTO without having to raise an
expensive and time-consuming federal court challenge. The agency
also would allow courts to find patents invalid based on the preponderance of the evidence, without having to find that clear and convincing evidence compels that result. Among other proposals, the report
further recommended that Congress require actual, written notice of
infringement from patentees, or deliberate copying, as the predicate
0
for liability for willful patent infringement."
Turning to health care, the FTC and DOJ held twenty-seven days
of joint hearings on the topic from February through October 2003.
The hearings broadly examined the state of the health care marketplace and the role of competition, antitrust, and consumer protection
in satisfying the preferences of Americans for high quality, cost effective health care. The hearings gathered testimony from approximately
250 panelists, including representatives of various provider groups,
insurers, employers, lawyers, patient advocates, and leading scholars
on subjects ranging from antitrust and economics to health care quality and informed consent. The report that followed examined the cur46

FTC Press Release, FTC and DOJ Issue Antitrust Guidelinesfor CollaborationAmong

Competitors (Apr 7, 2000), online at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/04/collguideline&htm (visited
Nov 26,2004).
47 FTFC Staff Report, Entering the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the World of B2B
Electronic Marketplaces (Oct 2000), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/b2breport.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
48
FTC Report, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent
Law and Policy (Oct 2003), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (visited
Nov 26,2004).
49 Id at 7-12.
50
Id at 16-17.
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rent role of competition in health care, how it can be enhanced to increase consumer welfare, and how antitrust enforcement can and
should work to protect existing and potential competition in health
care." The report found that competition has affected health care
markets substantially over the past three decades and that new forms
of organization and new strategies for reducing costs and enhancing
quality have developed in response to cost pressures. Nonetheless,
competition remains less effective than possible in most health care
markets because the prerequisites for fully competitive markets are
not satisfied. The report made a number of recommendations about
ways to encourage more competition, such as the provision of better
information about price and quality and the reduction of government
regulation that limits competition. 2
D. Employ a Broad Range of Policy Tools and Remedies
Sound competition policy requires not only identifying appropriate priorities through careful and thorough study of issues, but also
deciding how to accomplish an agency's substantive ends. The Commission has become more proficient over time in applying its array of
policy instruments in a systematic, coordinated way. For example, the
FTC has sought to remove impediments to competition in pharmaceuticals, pursuing this goal on multiple fronts. The FTC studied generic
drug entry prior to patent expiration, examining anticompetitive conduct by drug firms and recommending changes to the laws governing
generic entry;3 filed comments with the FDA, advocating that it make
the changes the study suggested;"' and testified before Congress to
support proposed legislation to increase competition in the industry.
The final legislation adopted the FTC's two main recommendations. 6
51
Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, Improving Health Care: A Dose of
Competition (July 2004), online at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf
(visited Nov 26,2004).
52
Id at 20-24.
53
See Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Priorto PatentExpiration:AnFTC Study
(2002), available online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
54 Comments of the FTC, In the Matter of Applicationsfor FDA Approval to Market a New
Drug; Patent Listing Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not Be
Infringed, No 02N-0417 (Dec 2002), online at http://www.ftc.govlbeV03002.pdf (visited Nov 26,
2004).
55 See PreparedStatement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Committee on Energy and Commerce,Subcommittee on Health, US. House of Representatives (Oct 9,2002), online
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/genericstestimony0210O9.pdf (visited Nov 26, 2004) (describing
the FTC's research on and enforcement actions related to the generic drug market).
56
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, Pub L No 108-173,
117 Stat 2066 (2003).
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Moreover, the FTC intervened in private suits to advance its arguments. In particular, it filed an amicus brief in private antitrust litigation about allegedly fraudulent representations to the FDA by a

branded drug company to forestall generic entry. 7 The court agreed
that such conduct was not immune from the antitrust laws." This important precedent should assist future enforcement against this kind
of conduct.
Finally, the FTC brought several cases challenging anticompetitive conduct by drug manufacturers, most of which resulted in consent
orders prohibiting such conduct." The agency also resolved concerns
about the competitive effects of a merger of two drug companies

through a consent agreement involving nine different markets.Of course, a competition agency cannot always solve by itself the
problems it identifies through research and study. The information and
expertise it develops, however, can add important knowledge in the

search for solutions. For example, FTC staff recently released a report
on online contact lens sales, which concluded that increased competition from online sellers can enhance consumer welfare and recommended that state policymakers rescind or refrain from adopting requirements, such as state licensing of contact lens sellers, that unduly
burden internet commerce." Similarly, the FTC, with the DOJ's Anti-

trust Division, has commented to state courts and legislatures, as well
as state and national bar associations, against expanding the definition

of the practice of law to restrain competition from nonattorneys for

activities such as real estate closings. 2 The agencies cautioned that
such restrictions likely raise consumers' costs and limit their competi-

tive choices without any evidence that this competition hurts consum-

57 Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae the Federal Trade Commission in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, MDL No 1410 (SD NY filed
Jan 8,2002), online at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/briefsfbuspirone.pdf (visited Nov 26,2004).
58
In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, 185 F Supp 2d 363,369-73 (SD NY 2002).
59 See, for example, In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co, No C-4076 (Apr 14, 2003)
(Decision and Order).
60 Pfizer, Inc and PharmaciaCorp, No C-4075 (May 27,2003) (Decision and Order) (finding that the drug companies involved violated the Clayton Act and the FTC Act).
61 See FTC Staff Report, PossibleAnticompetitive Barriersto E-Commerce: Contact Lenses
24 (Mar 2004), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/03/040329clreportfinal.pdf (visited Nov 26,
2004). Texas, for example, had implemented such a law. See id at 25, citing the Contact Lens
Prescription Act, Tex Occupational Code Ann § 353 (West 2004), previously at Vernon's Ann Tex
Civ Stat article 4552-A (requiring unlicensed contact lens sellers to obtain a physical copy of the
contact lens prescription before dispensing lenses). See also Lens Express v Ewald, 907 SW2d 64
(Tex App 1995) (upholding the physical prescription requirement).
62 See, for example, Brief Amici Curiae of the Federal Trade Commission and the United
States, McMahon v Advanced Title Services Co of West Virginia at 7-21 (cited in note 40) (arguing that prohibiting lay settlement services does not serve the public interest).
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ers. Thus far, most policymakers have refrained from adopting these
expanded definitions.
In sum, a competition agency should always consider both its substantive goals and the tools available to achieve its ends, either
through its own actions or through advocating the benefits of competition to other decisionmakers.
E.

Pay Attention to Institutional Capabilities

An important corollary to the previous guide is that an agency
must consider its institutional capabilities. As discussed in Part I, too
often the effectiveness of competition policy is equated with the number and visibility of cases pursued. Experience with competition policy
shows that this focus ignores the need to evaluate an agency's commitments in light of its institutional capabilities. There are multiple
blind spots. One is that the cramped view of what activity mattersprincipally litigation -discourages careful consideration of the full
range of tools available to address competition policy problems.
The FTC's antitrust agenda of twenty-five years ago involving
dominant firms provides a good example of unduly expensive litigation. In 1979, the agency had initiated and was pursuing nine monopolization or attempted monopolization cases. 3 Most sought structural
relief in the form of divestitures or mandatory licensing of trademarks
or other intellectual property. In addition to the shaky conceptual basis for most of these matters, the sheer number of large, difficult cases
was staggering. These included shared monopoly cases in the cereal
and oil industries and a massive investigation that contemplated another in automobiles; three cases to explore predatory pricing doctrine; two novel cases testing the boundary of exclusionary practices
doctrine; and a matter involving important and sensitive competition
concerns in the agricultural cooperative field.
A second failing is to ignore commitments that significantly outrun an agency's capability. Agencies can create a serious problem by
taking on so many matters that the agency lacks the human capital to
execute them well. Again the overambitious case load in the 1970s
overtaxed the agencies' capabilities," thereby raising doubts about the
63 Timothy J. Muris, How History Informs Practice- Understandingthe Development of
Modern US Competition Policy, remarks before the ABA Antitrust Section Fall Forum, Washington, D.C. 38-42 (Nov 19, 2003), online at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisfallaba.pdf
(visited Nov 26, 2004) (arguing that the FTC in the 1970s was overextended, both in taking on
too many large cases and in attempting too many novel causes of action).
64 The DOJ's dominant-firm program in the late 1960s and 1970s was as ambitious. From
1969 to 1974, the DOJ committed itself to restructuring the world's leading computer producer,
the country's two leading tire producers, and the world's largest telephone system.
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FTC's ability to handle the matters successfully. The Commission
would have been far better off choosing a smaller number of matters
and handling them well.
Finally, an agency must avoid the dilemma facing the dog chasing
the car: what to do once it catches it. Agencies must avoid cases that
enjoy some respectable theoretical support but involve implementation issues likely to prove overwhelming in actual prosecution. For
example, an agency should avoid cases with proposed solutions that
are infeasible or have costs that outweigh the benefits. Moreover,
some theories place unsupportable demands on the agency's ability to
make fine distinctions between acceptable and prohibited behavior.
Thus, the government cases in the 1970s challenging single-firm attempts to attain or exploit monopoly power were resource intensive
and largely unsuccessful. As discussed in his Essay, Chairman Pitofsky's attention to, and improvement of, antitrust remedies formed a
major accomplishment of his tenure."
Make Agency Actions and Agenda Transparent
Modern competition policy teaches an important lesson about
what competition authorities must do to develop support for their
programs. They must work continuously to articulate a positive
agenda and to state the assumptions that guide that agenda's formulation. Thus, FTC officials publicly discuss in detail what the agency does
in each area of its mandate -competition policy, consumer policy, and
the integration of economic analysis into both policies.
As chairman, I spoke and wrote often about the FTC's positive
agenda.6' Using the guidelines presented in this Essay and those
speeches, I identified four goals. First, promote competition as a basic
principle of economic organization through strong enforcement and
focused advocacy. Second, attack conduct that poses the greatest
threat to consumer welfare. Third, fully use the agency's distinctive
institutional capabilities by applying the entire range of policy instruments. Fourth, attach a high priority to improving the institutions and
processes by which antitrust policy is formulated and applied.
F.

65 See William E. Kovacic, FederalAntitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration:
Two Cheers for the Disappearanceof the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases, 12 Rsrch L
& Econ 173,182-92 (1989).
66 See Pitofsky, 72 U Chi L Rev 209 (cited in note 1).
67 See, for example, Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of US. Consumer Protection Policy, remarks at the Aspen Summit on Cyberspace and
the American Dream, the Progress and Freedom Foundation, Aspen, Colorado (Aug 18, 2003),
online at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/030819aspen.htm (visited Nov 26,2004).
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III. ISSUES THAT REMAIN TO BE ADDRESSED
I have attributed much of the FTC's success to a shared vision of
the proper role of a competition agency, a vision that has evolved for
over twenty years through several administrations and Chairs. To recapitulate, antitrust has become an area of bipartisan cooperation.
There is widespread agreement that the purpose of antitrust is to protect consumers, that economic analysis should guide case selection,
and that horizontal cases-both mergers and agreements among competitors- are the mainstays of antitrust. As Chairman Pitofsky's and
the other Essays in this Symposium reveal, there remain issues outside
this consensus. This Part briefly addresses three of these issues: the
proper standard for exclusionary behavior under § 2 of the Sherman
Act, what limits should be placed on vertical mergers, and whether in
practice antitrust enforcers actually consider efficiencies when evaluating mergers. We will see that, with the possible exception of monopolization cases, these controversies are truly at antitrust's edges.
Although the monopolization issue is crucial for private enforcement,
because the government brings so few monopolization cases, its impact on the FTC is not great.
A. The Sherman Act and Exclusionary Behavior
Turning to the first issue, some have expressed concern that the
government's brief urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in
Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP,6
proposed a new, and unduly stringent, standard for determining
whether exclusionary conduct is required for a § 2 claim based on unilateral action. 9 This is more of a perceived disagreement than an actual one, based on a misunderstanding of the government's summary
of the appropriate standard in its brief at the certiorari stage. While
the brevity of the discussion of what constitutes exclusionary conduct
in the certiorari brief probably muddied the waters, the government's
later brief on the merits clearly stated the proper standard, which is
that exclusionary conduct is essential to any § 2 claim based on unilateral action.'

540 US 398 (2004).
Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae, Verizon
Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP, No 02-682 (S Ct filed Dec 13,2002)
(available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 32354606).
70 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae, Verizon
CommunicationsInc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP, No 02-682, *13-20 (S Ct filed May
23,2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 21269559).
68
69
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The merits brief asserted that to prove monopolization or attempted monopolization the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in exclusionary conduct and that, in cases asserting a
duty to assist rivals, conduct is exclusionary only if it would not make
71
economic sense but for the tendency to impair rivals. This is sometimes called the "profit sacrifice" test. The brief also stated that applying this standard does not mean closely balancing social gains against
competitive harms, but rather that the "harm to competition must be
disproportionate to consumer benefits (in terms of providing a superior product, for example) and to the economic benefits to the defen7
dant (aside from benefits that accrue from diminished competition)."
The profit sacrifice test thus was said to be a special case, applying only to refusals to assist rivals and to predatory pricing. Although
one can criticize this test because modern economic theory posits
conditions under which refusals to deal (and predatory pricing) might
be anticompetitive, empirical support that these theories have practical significance is nonexistent. Accordingly, to avoid false positives, a
restrictive rule, such as the sacrifice test, is appropriate in these limited
circumstances.
Nevertheless, mostly because of active private enforcement, the
proper boundaries for Sherman Act § 2 enforcement remain the most
important antitrust issue lacking consensus. In part, the disagreement
reflects the lack of evidence regarding whether practices such as the
ones discussed in the previous paragraph and other so-called exclusionary practices, such as bundling and tying, are used with any frequency to harm consumers. The fact that so much of this Symposium is
devoted to § 2 issues illustrates both lack of consensus and the importance of these issues.
Vertical Mergers: Defining Limits

B.

A second issue at the margin of the antitrust consensus involves
3
vertical mergers. Although the 1984 vertical merger guidelines' are
outmoded, current government enforcement against vertical mergers
is sensible." Consider two recent FTC actions: Cytyc/Digene," which
71

Id at *14.

72

Id.

73

U.S. Department of Justice, 1984 Merger Guidelines,49 Fed Reg 26823,26834-37.

74 Many of the defense transactions challenged in the 1990s had strong vertical features, in

that a dominant firm with natural monopolist characteristics controlled one aspect of the market
and was attempting to merge with a firm upstream or downstream. These cases are also similar
to a number of telecommunications mergers that the DOJ challenged in the 1990s.
75 See FTC Press Release, FTC Seeks to Block Cytyc Corp.'sAcquisition of Digene Corp.
(June 24,2002), online at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/06/cytyc-digene.htm (visited Nov 26,2004).
Cytyc's products accounted for 93 percent of the U.S. market in liquid-based Pap tests, which
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involved complementary cervical cancer screening tests, and Synopsys/Avant!, 6 which concerned complementary integrated circuit design

software products. The FTC voted to block the former" and close its
investigation of the latter." Although the theory of competitive harm
in each involved the combined firm's incentive to use its market
power in one product to harm competition in the complementary
product, the method by which harm would occur, the incentives of the
firms to act anticompetitively, and the potential impact on competition
and consumers differed significantly between the cases, as did the
FTC's ability to forecast the likelihood of future events.
The means by which the combined Cytyc firm could harm rivals
were well defined. The theory was that Digene would no longer support liquid Pap test suppliers who were rivals to Cytyc in obtaining the
FDA approval necessary for use of the Digene product in combination with the rival's products." In contrast, the Synopsys theory was
that the firm would make improvements to its logical synthesis prod-

uct that worked better with the Avant! place-and-route product than

with rival products. Exactly what changes would occur was unclear.

Cytyc/Digene appeared to have strong incentives to act anticompetitively, while Synopsys/Avant!'s incentive to limit interoperability with
its rivals (and antagonize customers) was unclear.'
Moreover, in Cytyc, the only other liquid Pap test competitor and
potential new entrants would have been substantially impeded withwere the most widely used sensitive primary screening tool for the detection of cervical cancer.
Digene was the only company in the U.S. selling a DNA-based test for the human papillomavirus
(HPV), which was believed to cause nearly all cervical cancer cases.
76
See Statement of Commissioner Thomas B. Leary: Synopsys Inc/Avant! Corp, File No
021-0049 (July 26, 2002), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/avantlearystmnt.htm (visited
Nov 26,2004). Synopsys had a nearly 90 percent share of "logical synthesis" or "front-end" tools
for chip design, and Avant! had a roughly 40 percent share of so-called "place and route" or
"back-end" tools.
77 The FTC challenged Cytyc's proposed acquisition of Digene, alleging that the combination would reduce competition and increase consumer prices in the market for primary cervical
cancer screening tests. The parties abandoned the merger before FTC staff filed a motion in a
federal district court to enjoin the transaction. See FTC Seeks to Block Cytyc Corp.'s Acquisition
of Digene Corp (cited in note 75).
78 See Statement of Commissioner Thomas B. Leary (cited in note 76); Joseph J. Simons,
Report from the Bureau of Competition, remarks before the 51st ABA Antitrust Section Spring
Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Apr 4, 2003), online at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/
030404simonsaba.htm (visited Nov 26,2004).
79 By purchasing Digene, Cytyc could have limited the access of its only existing liquid Pap
test competitor, TriPath Imaging, to Digene's HPV test by making it more difficult for TriPath to
secure the needed approvals.
80 See Joseph J. Simons, Merger Enforcement at the FTC, Keynote Address to the Tenth
Annual Golden State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law Institute, Santa Monica, California
(Oct 24, 2002), online at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/021024mergeenforcement.htm (visited Nov 26,2004).
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out the merged firm's cooperation. In contrast, Avant! faced significant competitors downstream who would not be substantially impeded. Another difference between the cases involved the timing of
the anticompetitive threat. In Cytyc, the alleged potential harm would
occur in the short term. In contrast, the competitive harm in Synopsys
would not happen until well into the future, if at all.
C.

Merger Efficiencies: Providing Proof

Chairman Pitofsky also raises the treatment of merger efficiencies as an issue not yet in equilibrium.8' Misunderstandings about the
role of efficiencies in the guidelines, in prosecutorial decisions, and in
court decisions have led some antitrust attorneys to advise their clients not to make the effort necessary to put forward their best efficiencies case. On the FTC side, the dearth of sound, factually supported efficiencies presentations leads the agency usually to reject the
efficiencies that are claimed. When the parties present back-of-theenvelope calculations or advance claims of efficiencies with insufficient empirical support, the staff understandably will not accept them.
Although this may give the FTC a reputation for not welcoming efficiencies arguments, the only deserved reputation is one for rejecting
poorly developed arguments. Parties do not bother providing detailed
material, and, without such material, the agency does not believe an
efficiencies argument. This is a classic "chicken and egg" problem. Internally, however, both Chairman Pitofsky and I took seriously the
few substantial, well-documented efficiencies arguments we received."
Moreover, we both recognized that mergers can lead to a variety of
efficiencies.
CONCLUSION

Although there will always be close cases and issues at the margins that remain unsettled-witness the emphasis of this Symposium
on the search for appropriate standards for monopolization--at the
FTC there is now a clear understanding of the agency's core mission,
shared by the agency staff, the private entities it regulates, and its
peers in government. This shared vision is implemented through a
strategy that recognizes the many tools available to shape policy. Today, the FTC enjoys bipartisan political support and is largely immune
from the partisan squabbling that characterizes so much of our current political discourse.
81 See Pitofsky, 72 U Chi L Rev at 221-24 (cited in note 1).
82 Perhaps the best known example of the agency accepting efficiency claims involved the
GM-Toyota joint venture. See GeneralMotors Corp, 103 FTC 374 (1984).
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Nevertheless, the FTC has hard work ahead to retain its status as
a successful agency. In consumer protection, for example, it should
continue to develop tools to fight fraud, in particular increasing its
ability to mobilize government agencies around the world to reduce
the incidence and impact of consumer fraud. The FITC should also
continue its role as an advocate against the myriad restraints the government imposes mistakenly in the name of consumer protection. In
competition policy, the agency should continue to clarify the role of
antitrust law in policing business misuse of governmental processes to
harm consumers. The agency should also devote increased resources
to the monopolization issue, especially in studying those practices that
some economists claim can be used to exclude competitors to the detriment of consumers. Empirical evidence about the conditions under
which the practices harm or benefit consumers is essential for substantial progress in clarifying the law of monopolization.
Thus, great progress has been made, but much more remains to
be done. Although enforcement is its most consistently used tool, the
FTC should continue to employ its institutional capabilities carefully
and not measure success based solely on bringing cases. It should also
strive to make its actions and agenda transparent to all. Above all, the
FTC must recognize its important, but limited, role of enforcing the
basic rules that help a market economy function efficiently.
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